Abstract-This paper presents component failure rate data for use in assessment of lead lithium cooling systems. Best estimate data applicable to this liquid metal coolant are presented. Repair times for similar components are also referenced in this paper. These data support probabilistic safety assessment and reliability, availability, maintainability, and inspectability analyses.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE of the coolants of interest for future fusion breeding blankets is lead-lithium. As a liquid metal, it offers the advantages of high-temperature operation for good station efficiency, low pressure, and inherent coolant properties that allow moderate flow rates. This coolant is also under examination for use in test blanket modules to be used in the ITER international project. To perform reliability, availability, maintainability, and inspectability (RAMI) assessment and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of these cooling systems, component failure rate data are needed to quantify the system models. RAMI also requires repair time data. This paper presents the data that are available at present to support quantification and recommendations are given for the best values to use when quantifying system models.
II. FAILURE RATE DATA SOURCES
There are no known component failure rate data sets on cooling system components using lead-lithium coolant. The next best option is to use data from other liquid metals, since liquid metal systems share similarities of high operating temperature, moderate flow rate, and low pressure operation. Alkali metal cooling systems have been used and have generated component failure rate data. However, coolants, such as sodium, often use austenitic stainless steel components, while lead-lithium can corrode this material [1] . The Tritium Experiment (TRITEX) experiment, a lead-lithium flow loop, used a ferritic stainless steel labeled 1.4922 [2] . Ferritic and austenitic stainless steel are different materials even though they have comparable mechanical properties. There is little failure rate data for components made from ferritic stainless steels, but one report shows that HT-9 ferritic steel failure rates are directly comparable with those of 304 stainless [3] . Manuscript Failure rates of carbon steel and stainless steel piping [4] have been compared and tend to be less than an order of magnitude difference, often averaging about a half-order of magnitude difference for the same operating environment. This comparison is not wholly applicable to ferritic and austenitic stainless steel, but it is indicative that the failure rates of different steels are not widely different. As a first approximation, the sodium component failure rate data can be applied to components handling PbLi liquid metal coolant until more pertinent data become available.
There are a few sources of component failure rate data that have been collected from operating experiences of sodiumcooled fission reactors. Boisseau et al. [5] made estimates of failure rates for valves, motors, centrifugal and electromagnetic pumps, cold traps, heat exchangers, steam generators, and sensors based on the Rapsodie and Phenix plants as well as test loop experiences. Pamme [6] gave some KNK-II and other operating experience-based estimates for components in secondary sodium systems, including the steam generators, pumps, valves, and piping. Wood et al. [7] published globe valve failure rates in a sodium environment using a database called the Centralized Reliability Data Organization (CREDO). Eide et al. [8] published a large data set that also used CREDO. Bott et al. [9] published an earlier data set from CREDO data that addressed sodium valves and electromagnetic pumps. In the 1980s and 1990s, the CREDO database collected operating experiences from sodiumcooled U.S. and Japanese fission reactor facilities to support risk assessment. These operating experiences were collected for sodium coolant systems on the JOYO reactor (operating from 350°C to 500°C) and the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II, operating from 371°C to 473°C). There is also the EBR-II risk assessment that has failure rate values from CREDO and its own operating experience [10] . Although dated, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor risk assessment can also be a resource for component failure rates [11] . Operating experiences discussed in this paper show that impurities in liquid metal coolants are an important factor in cooling system reliability. These failure rate data sets, particularly Eide et al. [8] , were collected from a generation of fission reactors that conducted operations with as low coolant impurities as possible, using cold traps.
John et al. [12] presented analyst judgment failure rates for lead-lithium system components, based on existing operating experiences that were presumably from sodium systems. Schnauder et al. [13] gave tube and weld failure rates that were applied to not only helium-cooled blankets but also watercooled lead-lithium breeding blankets. The authors stated that U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. the values were a combination of data from the fission industry with some expert judgments on failure rate multipliers to account for enhanced welding techniques and weld inspection.
There is also guidance on applying data from water-cooled fission reactors to liquid metal cooled reactors [14] , [15] . Typically, water coolant system component average failure rate values are upper bounds to sodium component failure rates. If the analyst is faced with no liquid metal data for a particular component, then a component failure rate can be bounded using water system data. With these data sources, performing PSA on a liquid metal cooling system is possible.
III. RECOMMENDED FAILURE RATES
The quantitative data values from the referenced documents were compared. Some data sources were not as robust as others. Definitions of the equipment failure mode and the statistical error factor values for the failure rates were not always given. These omissions indicate that some data values were not arrived at as diligently as they were in other data sets. In general, the larger Eide data set [8] compared well with other values, often within a factor of 3. The recommended failure rates for components to be used in Pb-Li cooling systems are from Eide et al. [8] and are given in Table I . Readers may argue that the data sets are aged, but it is noted that these sodium values have been used recently [16] . The recommended approach is to use these data until new facilities generate enough experience data to perform a Bayesian update to these existing values.
IV. FAILURE MODES OF LIQUID METAL LOOPS
Failure modes and effects analysis is essential to RAMI. The literature was searched for any applicable liquid metal operating experiences with PbLi and similar coolants to support identification of failure modes. The most applicable experiences located were those of the TRITEX PbLi flow loop, which operated to study the behavior of tritium in lead-lithium. Otherwise, liquid metals are not widely reported upon outside of the nuclear fission industry. One nuclear fission conference proceedings on heavy liquid metal coolants contained several articles of interest and is discussed below. In addition, Cadwallader [17] compiled operating experiences for fission coolants other than water; these experiences can be used to recognize faults that could occur with a heavy liquid metal coolant. These findings are described below.
TRITEX operating experiences are very relevant to PbLi loops. While the TRITEX PbLi flow loop was not under neutron irradiation, it did operate from 250°C to 550°C, so its operating temperatures are within the expected temperature range of PbLi cooling loops. The main piping was 15 mm diameter and the flow rate was 0.1-2.5 L/min, or 1-25 cm/s flow velocities. The wetted surface area was 1.2-1.5 m 2 . Argon was used as a cover gas at 1 bar pressure. At high temperatures, in the 500°C range, the PbLi was found to be very fluid (i.e., low viscosity); it would easily flow out of small cracks or leaks [2] . Between 1988 and 1996, TRITEX ran for 13 000 h [18] . The small loop, small number of components, and low operating time are insufficient to give good component failure rate data statistics, but the operating experiences are indicative of the types of events, equipment failure modes, and problems that could occur with a PbLi flow loop. In the initial operating campaign, the staff determined that the electrical trace heating (3 kW) and the thermal insulation were insufficient; there was heat leakage. A second thermal box was constructed around loop piping runs to prevent heat leakage. It was observed that some small leaks of PbLi resolidified in the thermal insulation, thereby self-sealing the leak location. Selfsealing may have been more easily accomplished due to the low pressure in the system. The electromagnetic pump used on the loop had a titanium-zirconium-molybdenum (TZM) alloy outlet pipe, which was not found to not be compatible with the PbLi. It cracked in the first operating period, spilling ∼15 kg of alloy (15% of the TRITEX piping inventory). A TZM level indicator in the drain tank also failed and leaked air into the drain tank, where it reacted with the PbLi, preferentially oxidizing the lithium and depleting it from the alloy. About 3.5 kg of oxides were created and the remaining alloy contained less than 5 atom percent Li. The alloy in the drain tank had to be replaced. The system valves used metal bellows as a secondary seal around the valve stem. Some PbLi reached the bellows and had to be cleaned out. In some fission alkali metal cooling systems, hot coolant reaching the bellows has caused failure of the bellows [17] . Feuerstein et al. [18] noted that the staff was amazed that the electrical components in the electromagnetic (EM) pump, which had to be used to heat the alloy as well as move alloy, survived for the operating life of the flow loop, 13 000 h [18] . The EM pump magnets could reach 400°C in normal operation. The TRITEX piping was ferritic stainless steel, and some oxides and corrosion products were evident in the flow, as seen through the quartz viewing window installed in the flow loop. The staff could see oxide particles, which usually went into crusts that were visible through the window, and corrosion product particles in the mirror-like surface of the PbLi that was stated to be reminiscent of liquid mercury. Despite the careful procedures to keep the PbLi alloy pure, which included vacuum degassing, argon cover gas, and cleaning the pipework, oxides and corrosion products formed in the unirradiated loop. The staff noted some issues with valves leaking past their seats; the oxides and corrosion products apparently built up on the valve seats and prevented complete valve closure. One major power outage at the laboratory, due to a fault in their electrical distribution equipment, allowed the PbLi to freeze throughout the entire loop [18] . This total freeze required careful reheating to avoid overstressing the piping. The original TRITEX design flow rate of 5 L/min was not obtainable due to the liquid metal level differences created in the components at high flow rates, and the high temperatures developed in the EM pump when trying to attain high flow rates. When the TRITEX flow loop piping was drained, a film (87 ± 61 mg/cm 2 ) remained on the pipe surfaces, which accounted for 1% of the 100-kg piping inventory. Even though the drain was performed at 477°C, the film remained [18] .
Some TRITEX equipment and design practices deserve mention here. Two electromagnetic flow meters were used in addition to two mass flow meters provided. This redundancy in instruments is noteworthy. Redundancy increases both purchase and maintenance costs, but it also increases operational reliability and reduces the frequency of repairs, which can result in air ingress contamination. Two cold traps using wire mesh and external air cooling (using fins on the casing) were used. The alloy flow velocity in the cold traps was 13 times less than the main piping flow velocity. The cold traps served as deposition regions for impurities (such as Bi) and corrosion products (such as Fe and Cr), reaching a low temperature of about 280°C. The cold traps functioned adequately. Two magnetic traps operating at 650 Gauss were also used; one was simply permanent magnets placed outside sections of the main pipe, while the other was a small flow chamber placed in the piping-it had a removable lid for cleaning adhered particles. The magnetic traps primarily captured iron oxide corrosion products. A steel catch pan was used below the experiment. The catch pan was sized to accommodate ten times more liquid metal than the loop held. The loop held about 100 kg of PbLi and the drain tank reserve was an additional 20 kg.
The TRITEX drain tank was insulated and it was continually heated to 350°C to avoid thermal shock problems if the alloy had to be dumped to the drain tank on short notice [18] .
Drobyshev et al. [19] described some operational problems with liquid metal forced-circulation flow loops The authors stated that for personnel protection, all high-temperature portions of liquid metal systems should be placed in inert-gas chambers to reduce the risk of chemical reactions. These inert gas zones also form personnel exclusion zones. Catch pans should always be used to collect leaks, especially leaks from defects in construction materials-microcracks, micropores, bad weld joints, and so on. Drain lines must be heated to higher temperature than the freezing point of the alloy to avoid line plugging. An interlock should be used, so that when metal alloy leakage is sensed, the drain valves automatically open and the electrical heat tracing is depowered. In one flow loop, nichrome heaters wound onto piping were found to have short circuited to the pipe, so voltage was reduced to ∼48 V to preclude short circuiting.
The former Soviet Union used Pb-and PbBi-cooled fission reactors in land tests and for naval propulsion plants.
Gromov et al. [20] discussed the accidents that had occurred with heavy PbBi liquid metal coolants. The first event described occurred in a submarine propulsion reactor, the "Project 645," in 1968. In this event, investigators believed that air had been admitted to the primary coolant piping during pipe repairs. The air had reacted with the PbBi to form large amounts of lead oxide that plugged the piping. In addition, oil from the shaft seals for the coolant pumps had leaked into the PbBi, where the high temperatures pyrolyzed the oil into other hydrocarbons. These impurities coated the heat transfer surfaces, greatly retarding heat transfer from the reactor core, and plugged piping. The naval personnel did not understand what was occurring in the fission reactor, so they tried to compensate for power decreases by withdrawing control rods. The core overheated and fuel cladding failed. Fuel and fission products circulated in the primary coolant system. Lessons learned. 1) Use an inert gas blanket when performing maintenance on piping. 2) Use sensors to detect oxygen in the coolant. 3) Use gas-tight electric drivers or water seals on pump shafts. 4) Use a lead oxide recovery system in the coolant purification system. 5) Use coolant quality control to prevent oxide film formation on heat transfer surfaces.
Feuerstein et al. [2] discussed that air intrusion into the TRITEX PbLi caused Li 2 O to form and deplete the alloy of lithium. The authors stated that for air ingress to the loop at 550°C, 0.3% of the total liquid metal inventory would be oxidized within 1 h, and the oxides would contain 25% of the total lithium inventory. The submarine experience of Project 645 shows that Pb 2 O and PbO buildup on surfaces will attenuate heat transfer. Kondo et al. [21] have also studied that even very low oxygen potentials in Pb-Bi increase the liquid metal corrosion of steel components of the cooling system. Therefore, a cooling loop should avoid trapping air in the PbLi pipework. An oxygen sensor in the liquid metal, as suggested in the Project 645 lessons learned, would be a prudent measure to ensure that no air has intruded into the system. A cold trap should be included in the design to remove metal oxide impurities. The second event that Gromov et al. [20] discussed occurred with the "Project 705" submarine in 1971. One of the steam generators (Pb-Bi to water heat exchanger) had a slight leak in an access cover on the steam side due to a gasket flaw, and there was additional steam leakage due to some faulty welds. The compartment housing the steam generator thus tended to be high humidity and there was condensation on the compartment's cool surfaces. The condensed water droplets included chlorides that were present for water chemistry control. The chlorides caused corrosion on the austenitic stainless steel primary circuit and ancillary pipelines. In PbLi cooling systems, the piping will likely have insulation on the exterior, and given that the PbLi piping is typically held at 340°C and higher, the insulation will be warm. Any water intruding into the piping thermal insulation is expected to evaporate and deposit its residue chemicals in the insulation, not directly on the piping.
The third event that Gromov et al. [20] discussed occurred with the "Project 705K" submarine in 1982. This event was a confluence of errors. On this fission reactor, the primary Pb-Bi coolant pump had an adjusting manometer that was only to be used during plant shutdowns (speculation is that this manometer was used to verify proper fill of the pump tank and then it was supposed to be valved out before plant startup). The manometer was rated for 4 kg/cm 2 pressure, which was an adequate rating for shutdown conditions. The fission reactor underwent startup; the manometer had not been valved out as procedures specified. A steam generator tube fault occurred after reactor startup due to water chemistry control problems. The inlet water was supposed to be stripped of free oxygen by an electron-ion-exchanger filter that was charged with copper. Some copper escaped from the filter into the water and caused electrochemical corrosion of the steam generator tubing. The steam generator tubing was not made of the specified high nickel, corrosion-resistant steel alloy; a fabrication error had allowed the tubing to be constructed of common stainless steel that was more susceptible to copper corrosion. Water, at higher pressure than the PbBi, penetrated into the PbBi coolant and some collected in the pump tank. The pump tank pressure increased to 6 kg/cm 2 , and the manometer failed. PbBi and steam leaked from the pump tank into the reactor compartment. The crew in the compartment were TABLE II SOME COMPONENT REPAIR TIMES [16] , [24] exposed to radioactive contamination in air, especially Po-210. Fortunately, no one received high radiation exposures. The highest exposure was 10% of the annual maximum permissible exposure. Gromov et al. [20] did not give the operating temperature of the PbBi coolant; however, Merrill et al. [22] stated that even at room temperature, neutron-irradiated PbLi will release some Po-210. In this steam generator event, the unit was constructed of incorrect materials. The oxygen radical collector made with copper had failed, contaminating the secondary coolant system and attacking the steam generator tubes.
Other pertinent design criteria and operating experiences were given by Yu Bagdassarov et al. [23] . He stated that the required difference between the lowest coolant temperature in the system (i.e., the heat exchanger outlet or the core inlet temperature) and the freezing point of the liquid metal be at least a T of 150°C. The authors further stated that liquid lead corrosion increases when the Pb temperature rises above 540°C, so the smaller the temperature rise across the heat input section of the cooling loop, the better to keep structural material corrosion at low levels.
V. REPAIR TIME DATA There are not many sources for hands-on repair times of liquid metal cooling system components. Like component failure rates described above, the majority of data available are from sodium coolant systems. Cadwallader [24] has a bibliography of documents that discuss some repair times for mechanical and electrical equipment used in nuclear facilities, including sodium-cooled fission reactors. There are some other values in the literature for sodium cooling systems [6] , [11] , [12] , [16] , [25] . Table II gives some representative repair times. It should be noted that for sodium systems, often a "freeze plug" is used, where fans are used to force room air over a section of pipe, so that the pipe cools and sodium freezes in a small, localized section of the pipe to form a coolant plug. Setting up fans and establishing a freeze plug (and allowing reheating of the plug metal) adds some time to a repair of piping, flanges, valves, instruments, and so on.
Sazonov et al. [26] described repair activities on the USSR submarine reactors using lead-bismuth coolant (there were several Alfa class submarines with PbBi cooled fission reactors [27] ). The small reactor compartments in the submarines restricted the space available for maintenance work, making the work more difficult. The authors stated that there were positive features of the PbBi coolant: low induced gamma activity, chemical inertness of the coolant (however, oxidation does present a safety issue with this coolant [20] ), no significant spills due to the high melting point, and no liquid radioactive waste as compared to water-cooled reactors. They also stated that coolant valves had no failures and that none of the major equipment items (e.g., pumps) in these reactor installations required significant reconditioning. There were some minor coolant leaks when samples were taken for chemical analysis; this was believed to be due to human error. Minor repairs to cooling systems were performed under hot conditions with no coolant flow but using a steam source on shore to maintain the metal coolant temperature above freezing; applying the steam source was stated to be a labor-intensive and complex procedure, but necessary to avoid the pipe stress issues with freezing and thawing lead-bismuth. Nitrogen was used as a gas blanket to prevent coolant oxidation in air. Pumps had gaskets and removable parts replaced (e.g., impellers), and oxygen sensors in the coolant were also replaced. They did not give task time durations or counts of workers needed for these activities, but given the complexity of the task (rigging temporary steam heat piping from the shore and nitrogen gas blanketing) compared with setting up fans to freeze-plug sodium coolant, it is obvious that the times for repairs of heavy liquid metal system components in submarine reactors were greater than those for sodium coolant. Analyst judgment is needed when applying repair time values in RAMI studies of PbLi cooling systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
The information presented and referenced in this paper will give good support to analysts who are assessing the probabilistic safety or RAMI of a PbLi liquid metal cooling system. Failure mode data are important to analysts and designers to understand failure mechanisms, so that these mechanisms can be precluded in design, or be prevented by the use of good operating practices. The quantitative data presented here can be used until enough operating experience with PbLi cooling systems has accumulated to allow a statistical Bayesian update to the values.
